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Introduction
The research on thinking and reasoning about conditionals has known a long history
fuelled by  the  interest  of  cognitive  scientists  focussing on the  linguistic,  logical  and
psychological  aspects  of  ‘if'.  Such  interest  is  readily  framed  by  the  centrality  of
conditional relationships. Our ability to reflect on potential implications of what is, could
have been, or will be predicates some of the prime examples of human cognition. Evans et
al.  (2003) recently presented the results of three studies within a novel experimental
paradigm. In this sentence-evaluation task people are informed about the exact number
of cases of each of the four possible combinations between the affirmation or denial of
antecedent (e.g. “The figure is red” or “The figure is blue’) and consequent (e.g., “The
figure is a triangle, or ‘the figure is a Square’) of a conditional (e.g., ‘if the figure is Red,
then it is a triangle’).  People are then asked to judge how likely it is that the conditional
is true of a particular case drawn at random form the set (with, i.c., a particular number
of red or blue triangles and red or blue squares). Evans et al. (2003) distinguished three
hypotheses  about  the interpretation of  conditionals (see Table  1).  These conjunctive,
conditional-probability,  and  material-implication  interpretations  are  defined  as  a
function of the contingencies/possibilities people would represent/consider. Evans et al.
(2003) showed that their participants’ behaviour is best explained by the conjunctive and
the  conditional-probability  hypothesis,  whereas  their  findings  counter  the  material-
implication hypothesis (also see Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2003). For instance, they showed
that an increase in the absolute frequency of false-antecedent cases (e.g. ‘Blue squares’
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vis-a-vis ‘If the figure is Red, then it is a Triangle’) reduced the truthfulness ratings of the
conditionals,  whereas  one  would  expect  the  opposite  under  the  material-implication
hypothesis because such false-antecedent cases make the Material implication true (see
Table 1). Evans et al.’s also regressed the observed truthfulness ratings to the predicted
truth-fullness  ratings  and  observed  that  individuals  fell  into  two  groups,  whose
performance is best explained by an interpretation that corresponds to the conjunction
or the conditional probability. In Evans et al.'s discussion of the data they consider the
mental-models theory. We show that the presumed evidence against material implication
is  not  inconsistent  with  mental-models  theory and  that  neither  the  conjunction
hypothesis nor the conditional-probability hypothesis conflicts with a proper treatment
of mental-models theory (i.e., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002).
 
Table 1 : Contingencies represented under different interpretations of a conditional of the form ‘if p
then q’.
Guilt by Association
Evans  et  al.  claimed  to  have  “shown  why  the  assumption  of  material  implication
embedded  in  the  mental  model  theory  of  conditional  reasoning  (Johnson-Laird  and
Byrne, 1991, 2002) is unjustified” (p. 334). They draw this conclusion on the basis of their
evidence  showing  that  people  do  not  represent  ordinary  conditional  statements  as
material conditionals. We do not contest that in the context of Evans et al.’s experiments,
ordinary  conditional  statements  are  not  represented as  material  conditionals.  In  the
following we will  however expose the sophistry in the presumed implications of  this
finding for mental-models theory,  which rests on misconceptions about the material-
implication hypothesis and/ in mental-models theory. 
Evans et al.  associate the material-implication hypothesis with mental-models theory,
which they can justifiably do within certain boundaries (see, the core meaning principle:
Johnson-Laird &Byrne, 2002, p. 650). They claim that “under the material conditional, the
probability of a conditional [if p then q] and its contra positive [if not-q then not-p] must
be  the  same.”  (Evans  et  al.,  2003,  p.  325).  Given  that  it  is  easy  to  show  that  this
‘equivalence assumption' is false, which they did by showing that the probability ratings
of the conditional and its contrapositive differ substantially, they succumb to making
mental-models theory guilty by association. Their guilt-by-association argument goes as
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follows.  First,  they  associate  the  material-implication hypothesis  with  mental-models
theory (a psychological theory). Second, they then forget about psychology and make the
logical  equivalence-prediction.  Third,  they  then  show  that  the  (logical)  equivalence-
hypothesis is false and argue that therefore the material-implication hypothesis (and a-
fortiori)  mental-models  theory is  (psychologically)  false/invalid.  The above argument
attests to a form of so-called naive falsificationism1 and makes an unfair move in the
evaluation of mental-models theory. The equivalence prediction is a logical and hence not
necessarily a psychologically plausible prediction. It is misleading and false to suggest
that the mental-models theory makes the equivalence assumption. 
First, since the mental-models theory adheres to the implicit-model principle (Johnson-
Laird & Byrne, 2002) it is false to claim or even suggest that the theory subscribes to the
equivalence  hypothesis.   The  implicit-model  principle  yields  the  following  initial
representation for ‘if p then q’:
p         q
...
The initial model for the contrapositive ‘if not-q then not-p’ is:
not-q not-p
...
The  non-equivalence  in  the  initial-model  representations  clearly  shows  that  the
equivalence  prediction  cannot  be  made  within  mental-models  theory.  Second,  it  is
misleading to suggest otherwise.  How would a theory ever become “one of  the most
influential theories of human reasoning” (Evans et al.,  2003, p.  324) if  it  cannot even
account for the basic phenomena? For instance, Pollard and Evans (1980) asked whether
the  contrapositive  follows  from  the  conditional  and  observed  that  only  59%  of  the
participants  accepted the  equivalence (if  p  then q,  hence if  not-q  then not-p).  They
obviously did not give the option to indicate that ‘if p then q’ follows from ‘if p then q”.
Indeed, it  has also long been established that a knowledge-lean Modus Ponendo Ponens
argument  (MPP:  If  p  then  q,  p;  therefore  q)  is  almost  universally  accepted
(Schroyens, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle, 2001a, 2001b; also see Schroyens & Schaeken, 2003).
It is also known that the Modus Tollendo Tollens argument (MTT: If p then q, not-q;
therefore  not-p)  is  endorsed  much  less  frequently  than  MPP.  If  the  equivalence
hypothesis were to hold, then mental-models theory would not be able to account for the
lower endorsement rates of MTT as compared to the near universally accepted MPP: the
categorical premise ‘not-q’ in MTT defines an MPP on the contrapositive ‘if not-q then
not-p’.
Not only mental-models theory rejects the equivalence assumption. None of the so-called
mental-logics  theories  (see,  e.g.,  Braine & O'Brien,  1998;  Rips,  1994)  subscribe to  the
equivalence hypothesis; and neither does the probabilistic model of Oaksford, Chater and
Larkin (2000) for the obvious reason that the conditional probability of q, given p (the
probability of MPP in this model) does not equal the conditional probability of not-p
given not-q (i.e., the probability of MTT). Evans et al. are right in stating that “if p then q”
is logically equivalent with “if not-q then not-p”. But this logical fact (a strawman) is not
particularly pertinent since they are reporting/considering a psychological study/theory.
In making the equivalence prediction one fails to distinguish logic and psychology. Evans
et al. wrench several other logical equivalences. For instance, they state that “under the
material conditional, the higher this [false-antecedent] probability, the higher should be
the overall judged probability because material conditionals are always true when the
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antecedent is false” (p. 13). That a material implication is true when the antecedent is
false is a matter of textual fact in propositional calculus, but it is not what is considered
to be the case in human reasoning. Evans et al (2003) also go on a slippery slope when
stating that “thus according to Johnson-Laird and Byrne, the core meaning of an ordinary
conditional makes it equivalent to the material conditional, to either not-p or q” (p.
324). The equivalence between ‘if p then q’ and ‘either not-p or q’ is a formal logical
equivalence; it is not supposed to be a psychological equivalence (Schaeken, Johnson-
Laird, Byrne & d’Ydewalle, 1996). By not making a careful enough distinction between the
principles of standard logic and the principles of the psychological mental-models theory,
they have constructed unseemly arguments that make mental-models theory guilty by
association. 
“The” interpretation(s) of “if” in mental-models theoryA conjunctive interpretation of
“if”
Under the conjunction-hypothesis people would consider only the contingency explicitly
mentioned  in  ‘if  p  then  q'.  Evans  et  al.  indeed  observed  increased  ratings  of  the
conditional’s probability when the frequency of the TT,[p_q] contingency was higher.
They  also  observed a  ‘false  antecedent  effect’:  decreased probability  ratings  with  an
increase of false-antecedent cases. As a consequence of the set up of their experiments,
the relative frequency of [p_q] cases decreased when the frequency of false-antecedent
cases  increased.  The  ‘false-antecedent  effect',  thus,  also  concurs  with  a  conjunctive
interpretation. Evans et al. claim that it is “difficult to reconcile this finding with the
claim of Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002) that the core meaning of a conditional is to allow
for the extension of the possibilities of pq, ~pq, ~p~q (or the equivalent TT, FT and FF
cases)” (p. 329). When we gauge some of claims they made at other points, it becomes
clear that the false-antecedent effect is  not difficult  to reconcile with mental  models
theory and was actually  to be expected.  Evans et  al.  themselves  note that  the false-
antecedent effect is consistent with the conjunction hypothesis and at the same time
mention that “Johnson-Laird and Byrne do predict that many people will give P(p.q) [i.e.,
the conjunctive probability] as the initial probability of the conditional” (p. 325; also see,
Oberauer et al., 2003).2 It follows necessarily that Evans et al. have to agree that the false-
antecedent effect is consistent with (if not predicted by) mental-models theory.
A probabilistic interpretation/evaluation of “if”
Evans et  al.  (2003)  state that  “[mental-models  theory]  is  inconsistent  with a relation
between ordinary conditionals and conditional probability” (p. 324). There are multiple
ways in which mental-models theory is consistent with conditional probability. Indeed, as
noted already by Johnson-Laird and Byrne, the probabilistic interpretation ‘if p then
probably q' is not to be confused with the probabilistic evaluation ‘probably if p then
q'.  In  both  cases  people  would  have  a  probabilistic  representation of  the  two
different  possibilities  (i.e.  TT,  [p_q]  and  TF,  [p_not-q]),  and  a  comparison  of  the
frequency/probabilities  yields  a  conditional-probability  estimate.  The  presumed
inconsistency  of  mental-models  theory  (Johnson-Laird  &  Byrne,  2002)  rests  on  a
uncharitable reading of two explanatory principles: the core-meaning principle and the
truth principle. Indeed, Evans et al. also claimed to have “shown ... why the principle of
truth in this theory is untenable” (p. 334). Consider the conditional:
“If the figure is a square, then the figure is red.”
 about a set with 60 red and 10 yellow squares. The conditional cannot be true of the set
and numerous studies (e.g., Evans et al., 1996) have shown that most people judge TF,
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[p_not-q] cases to be inconsistent or false. Given that people have the ‘Gricean’ tendency
to assume (at least to start with) that the information one is confronted with is true (see,
e.g., Grice, 1975; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Johnson-Laird & Savary, 1999; Levinson,
2000; Schroyens, 1997, Schroyens, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle, 1996, 1999), they know, on the
one hand, that it would not be possible that there are yellow squares. On the other hand
they also see that there are in fact yellow squares. People have three options to cope with
this inconsistency. First, they could question and/or deny the given facts. Second, they
could question and modify  their  reading of  the strict  conditional  ‘if  p  then  q’ to  the
tautological, probabilistic conditional ‘if then possibly q’ or, third, they could accept the
falsity of the conditional and evaluate ‘probably if p then q’. The latter two options seem to
require the least cognitive effort (see, Sperber & Wilson, 1986).
When being faced with a tautological conditional or having such an interpretation of the
conditional, people would form a representation of the following two possibilities: 
square (red)
square (not-red)
...
Indeed, “conditionals have mental models representing the possibilities in which their
antecedents are satisfied” (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 2002, p. 654). People would have
little  to  no  difficulty  to  elaborate  their  representation  of  the  conditional  with  the
explicitly provided frequentist information about the different possibilities represented
in  this  initial  mental-model  set   (see,  Johnson-Laird,  1983;  Johnson-Laird,  Legrenzi,
Girotto, Legrenzi, & Caverni, 1999): “If the cardinality of the set matters, then models can
be tagged with numerals, just as they can be tagged to represent numerical probabilities
(see, Johnson-Laird et al.,  1999)” (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2003, p.  655).  The numerals
obviously matter when asked to rate the probabilities. That is, people would represent, in
some way:
square-(red): 60 
square-(yellow): 10
...
This means that people would have little to no difficulty in recognizing that there are 70
instances where the figure is a square, and that there are 60 out of these 70 cases wherein
this square is coloured red. In conclusion, mental-models theory is not inconsistent with
a  relation between the  ordinary  conditional  and conditional  probability,  contrary  to
Evans et al.  intuition. Conditional-probability estimates can arise from a tautological/
probabilistic interpretation of ‘if'. Such a probabilistic interpretation is evidenced by a
number of studies (see, e.g., Liu, Lo, and Wu, 1996; Oaksford et al., 2000; Stevenson &Over,
1995).
Instead  of  eliminating  the  inconsistency  between  the  Gricean  assumption  that  the
utterances  are  true  and  the  factual  observation  to  the  contrary  by  pragmatically
modulating the proposition, people can simply abandon the Gricean assumption. People
accept that the conditional is strictly false. Taking this option is more plausible in the
context of Evans et al.’s (2003) experiments since it confirms the presumption inherent in
questioning how likely the rule is true of a card from the set: when one considers how
likely it is true, one presumes it is not true as such. In evaluating ‘probably/sometimes if
p then q’, people would represent both the truth and falsity of the rule: Sometimes it is
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true, sometimes it is false. In short, (some but not all) people would construct an initial
representation of the conditional that also includes the truth-status of these TF cases. 
square-(red): 60 | False [square-(yellow): 10]
This representation concurs with Ramsey's (1929/1990, p. 155) suggestion that:
If two people are arguing 'If p will q?' and both are in doubt as to p, they are adding p
hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis about q; so that in a
sense 'if p, q' and 'If p, not q' are contradictories.
The applicability of the Ramsey test is not surprising, since the test is explicitly intended
for an evaluation of the question “if p will q?” and this is what Evans et al. (2003) asked
their participants to do.
A probabilistic evaluation is not inconsistent with mental-models theory, and especially
its  truth-principle:  “The  principle  does  not  imply,  however,  that  individuals  never
represent false cases” (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002, p. 654). When asked to contemplate
on the falsity of something, people will do so. This does not impinge on the idea that
people generally work under the assumption that the information they work with is true
and  will  not  consider  the  falsity  of  it  without  due  reason.  In  presenting  the  truth-
principle Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002)  state that “a mental  model  of  an assertion
represents a possibility given the truth of the assertion” (p. 653, italics added). The
idea that people represent only true possibilities is indeed erroneous when one forgets
that these possibilities would be presented given the truth of the assertion. It is
actually this Gricean truth-assumption that is put into question when people are asked
whether the conditional is true/false. It is no longer a given. The truth-principle hinges
on the truth-assumption, the assumption that people generally adhere to the Gricean
maxim of conversation that ones’ contribution to discourse should be truthful (which also
makes sense in terms of cognitive economy given the ontological primacy of ‘being’ vs.
‘not being’, truth vs. falsity/non-truth). 
Conclusion
We have shown that mental-models theory is much more complex and with many more
intricate details than would be apparent from Evans et al. treatment of it. Evans et al.
focussed  on  the  core-meaning  assumption  (Johnson-Laird  &  Byrne,  2002)  and  its
undeniable link with the thesis that the sentential connective ‘if' is the natural language
equivalent of material implication in formal propositional calculus. This focus resulted in
a neglect of other aspects of the theory and seems to have yielded the general idea that
there is only one, a conditional/material-implication interpretation of the conditional.
This made them claim that alternative interpretations are inconsistent with the theory.
Though Evans et al.’s data are interesting, their theoretical interpretation of the data as a
critique of mental-models theory goes amiss.
In response to a more elaborate presentation of our critique (Schroyens & Schaeken,
2003), Evans (personal communication, June 2003) replies that:
 "If the model theory gives up the principle of truth and then adds representation of
frequencies plus a previously unspecified mechanisms of relative frequency judgement,
then of course it can account for judgements of conditional probability theory. This,
however, is not remotely the theory of JLB to which we refer in the paper"
This provides strong support for the validity of our arguments; the remaining point of
contention being whether this is part of the theory as it is narrated by Johnson-Laird and
Byrne  (2002).  It  is  misleading  to  say  that  it  is  not.  Johnson-Laird  and  Byrne  (2002)
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obviously enough did not predict the different evaluation-types: Evans et al. (2003) did
construct a novel task. The fact that Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002) did not make some
particular prediction and have not yet  specified the predictions for new studies that
might become available in the future, however, does no imply that conjunctive and/or
conditional-probability evaluations are not predictable with the mental-models theory as
it  was  specified  by  Johnson-Laird  and  Byrne  (2002).  We  will  show  that  are  indeed
predictable from Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2003).
In Evans’ comment we quoted above, he repeats the three explanatory assumptions we
invoked. The textual evidence proofs that these are clearly not beyond Johnson-Laird and
Byrne  (2002).  First,  "The  principle  does  not  imply,  however,  that  individuals  never
represent false cases" (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002, 654). That is, one does not need to
abandon the truth-principle. Second: "if the cardinality of the set matters, then models
can  be  tagged  with  numerals,  just  as  they  can  be  tagged  to  represent  numerical
probabilities (see Johnson-Laird et al., 1999)."(Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 2002, p. 655) That
is, it is not an ad hoc elaboration of ours to assume that frequencies can be represented.
Third, it seems rather obvious that new tasks require to specification of some new task-
specific mechanisms. Evans et al. (2003) were not impeded by the need for (and lack of) a
mechanism of relative frequency judgements when they discuss the material implication
hypothesis,  which  they  associate  with  mental  models  theory:  "...  summing  up  the
probabilities of these models leads, of course, to a judgement equal to the probability of
the material conditional' (p. 325, italics added). Indeed, of course. In short, the expected
theoretical import of our argumentation – showing that it is false to claim that mental-
models  theory  "is  inconsistent  with  a  relation  between  ordinary  conditionals  and
conditional probability",  by showing that it  is not inconsistent – is agreed upon by J.
Evans.
Evans et al.’s unfortunate representation of mental-models theory appears to be due to
some misapprehension in their reading of Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002). Evans et al.
repeatedly and consistently refer to the “core meaning of ordinary conditionals”. Upon a
critical,  close and careful  reading of  Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002)  this  is  almost a
contradiction in terms. Johnson-Laird and Byrne speak of the core meaning of basic 
conditionals:  “those  [conditionals]  with  a  neutral  content  that  is  as  independent  as
possible from context and background knowledge, and which have an antecedent and
consequent that are semantically independent apart from their occurrence in the same
conditional”  (p.  649).  Ordinary  conditionals  clearly  are  not,  cannot  be  basic 
conditionals. Ordinary conditionals are characterised by the fact that they are not neutral
in content, that they are dependent from context and background knowledge, and that
they have an antecedent and consequent that are not semantically independent. When
people are explicitly given information about the prevalence of particular contingencies,
as was the case in Evans et al. (2003), we are not dealing with a basic conditional. The
conditional  “if  the  card is  yellow,  then it  has  a  circle  printed  on it”,  is  clearly  not
independent from a context that gives the following information about a deck of cards:
There is 1 yellow circle,
There are 4 yellow diamonds,
There are 16 red circles
There are 16 red diamonds
About this deck of cards (with a particular frequency distribution), people are asked to
judge how likely it is that the conditional is true of a card randomly drawn at random
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from it.  Asking this  about the deck of  cards ensures that  the contextual  information
becomes relevant, and ascertains that we are not dealing with a basic conditional that is
neutral  in  content  and  independent  of  the  context.  Johnson-Laird  and  Byrne  (2002)
“describe how a  conditional's  context  can affect  its  interpretation,  and ...outline the
different  possible  interpretations  of  conditionals  that  these  effects  of  semantic  and
pragmatic modulation can yield” and did not fail  to mention that “In both cases,  by
definition, we are no longer dealing with basic conditionals." (p. 658, italics added). When
we consider peoples' interpretation of ordinary (non-basic) conditionals, the processes of
semantic and pragmatic modulation cannot be bypassed. Their theoretical significance is
one of  providing explanatory principles that allow us to capture the import(ance)  of
semantics and pragmatics, content and context. It will be clear that human reasoning,
even in highly semantically-impoverished experimental settings, is always performance
in  situ.  When taking pragmatics  into account  (which in practice,  i.e.,  in  the practice
psychological research, one cannot not do) one cannot justly say that the interpretation
(vs. core meaning) of the conditional is or must be the material conditional, only
that is can be the material conditional. Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002)
explicitly  noted  that  their  “aim  is  to  make  the  theory  of  meaning
independent  of  the theory  of  comprehension”  (p.  648).  Evans  et  al.’s
misleading guilt-by-association argumentation is in part due to a failure
to recognize this diﬀerence between the meaning of a proposition, and
the interpretation of a sentence.
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NOTES
1.The Duham-Quine thesis in philosophy of science attests to the idea that any prediction
is derived from a conglomerate of premises, hypotheses and that, hence, a falsification of
the prediction can not be taken to falsify one specific assumption.
2. Evans et al. also state that "it is unclear whether they are fully justified in making
exactly this prediction, given the mental footnote element of their theory" (Evans et al.,
2003, p.325; comments added). This reflects undue suspect. They themselves say: "The
theory is not determinate at the level of individual participants" (Evans et al, 2003, p. 324;
see, Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002, p. 654-655). For the purpose of our argument it suffices
the conjunction-hypothesis is accepted as being consistent with (vs. predicted by)
mental-models theory. Oberauer and Wilhelm (2003) correctly considered that the
conjunctive-probability evaluations are predictable within mental-models theory.
ABSTRACTS
We show that by failing to distinguish between logical versus psychological predictions, Evans,
Handley, and Over (2003) created strawman arguments that make mental-models theory (MMT;
i.e., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002) guilty by its association with assumptions that are known to be
psychologically invalid. We also illustrate that MMT allows for different interpretations of ‘if’,
including the conjunctive (‘p and q’) or probabilistic (‘if p then possibly q’ or ‘possibly if p then
q’)  interpretation  allegedly  beyond  the  capacity  of  MMT,  and  conclude  that  science  is  not
advanced by a cursory reading of (as such oversimplified) theories that are consequently easy to
refute.
On montre que l’absence de distinction entre prédictions logiques et prédictions psychologiques
chez Evans, Handley et Over (2003) a donné naissance à de pseudo-arguments qui rendent la
théorie des modèles mentaux (TMM) de Johnson-Laird & Byrne (2002) coupable par association
avec des hypothèses connues pour être invalides psychologiquement. On montre aussi que la
théorie  des  modèles  mentaux   permet  différentes  interprétations  du  « si »,  parmi  lesquelles
l’interprétation conjonctive (‘p et q’) et l’interprétation probabiliste (‘si p, alors peut-être q’ ou
‘peut-être si  p,  alors q’)  qui sont selon Evans et al.  hors de portée de la théorie des modèles
mentaux.  Il  apparaît  en  conclusion  que  la  science  n’a  rien  à  gagner  d’une  lecture  rapide  et
simplificatrice de théories dont la réfutation devient du coup aisée.
INDEX
Keywords: conditionals, mental models theory, interpretation, meaning, if, conditional
probability
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